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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A) Introduction
"Discourage litigation. Persuade neighbors to compromise whenever you can.
Point out to them how the nominal winner is often the real loser in fees, expenses, and a
waste of time. As a peacemaker the lawyer has a superior opportunity of becoming a
good (person). "'
The term Alternative Dispute Resolution covers several dispute resolution
techniques as mediation, arbitration, summary jury trials, early neutral evaluation, and
minitrials as well as negotiations in general.
2
This thesis will first discuss the advantages of mediation in contrast to the
traditional court-litigation in divorce cases, which cannot satisfactorily solve the
complex issues in this emotionally exceptional situation. It will then focus on the
mediation process and describe the variety of alternative dispute resolution techniques
mediators can use to facilitate the settlement discussions between the divorcing spouses
and help them to work out a final agreement that is adapted to their individual situation.
The main part of the thesis deals with the weaknesses of mediation in cases of
severe power imbalance between husband and wife and suggests limitations to
mediation in certain cases. Finally it will address ethical problems with attorney
^ Abraham Lincoln, Notes for a law lecture, July 1, 1850, taken from Steven C. Bowman, Idaho 's
Decision on Divorce Mediation, 26 Idaho L. Rev. 547, Fn 1 referring to F. Hill, Lincoln The Lawyer. 102
(Century, 1906), reprinted in Comment, The Mediator Lawyer: Implications for the Practice ofLaw, 34
UCLA L REV 507, 507 (1986).
2 Lynn A. Kerbeshian, ADR: To Be Or...?, 70 N.D.L. Rev. 381. 382 (1994).
2participation in mediating divorce cases and discuss several models to reconcile the
difference between lawyer - mediators and non- lawyer mediators.
The thesis will conclude with a broad discussion of a hotly disputed issue,
namely the protection of confidentiality of information which parties disclose during the
mediation process.
B) Historical Outline - The beginning of Mediation
Several stages of development of Alternative Dispute Resolution methods led to
the mediation technique as known today in the United States. Mediation originated in
labor disputes, which were settled by mediators in the U.S. but also in England^. The
history of mediation in domestic relations however dates back to the 19**" century, when
churches and other social organizations as schools and communities offered mediation
for spouses who were about to dissolve their relationship."^
However, it was not until 1930 that divorce courts more and more realized the
difficulties and inefficiency of the traditional adversarial litigation system in family
matters, which are highly emotional and complex. The primary alternatives to a court
litigated process in divorce cases are mediation and arbitration, which promote the
discussions between divorcing couples and help them to tackle post - divorce issues in a
less aggressive and more cooperative way.^ Consequently courts started to recommend
mediation to divorcing couples as a voluntary and effective alternative to the costly
litigation process.^
3 John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward F. Sherman, Processes of Dispute Resolution, The Role of
Lawyers,295 {\996).
4 Id. at 296.
^ Daniel J. Guttman, For Better Or Worse. Till ADR Do Us Part: Using Antenuptial Agreements to
Compel Alternatives To Traditionel Adversarial Litigation, 12 Ohio St. J. on Dispute Resolution, 175,
181 (1996).
" John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward F. Sherman, Processes of Dispute Resolution. The Role of
Lawyers, 296/297(1996).
3California was the most progressive state in the U.S. to develop statutes for
mediators.^ In 1939 it established a Conciliation Court for usually undisputed divorces
in which parties got the opportunity to settle their matters in a non - adversarial way.^ In
the 1980s finally, because of the growing number of divorced couples and the
liberalization of family law (no - fault - divorce) California mandated mediation for
child custody matters^. It is no longer optional for couples to try to reach an agreement
on child custody in pre - court settlements; instead it has become a presupposition for
litigating this matter in court.
The development of no - fault divorce and the popularity of mediation in
domestic relations were the consequence of a changed public opinion on divorce. The
desire to get divorced was no longer regarded as a morally questionable decision and
law should no longer serve as a punishment for the spouse who was willing to get
divorced. It was time to remove condemnation, shame and guilt from divorce.'^
The nationwide popularity of mediation as an Alternative Dispute Resolution
method in divorce cases, however, came with O.J. Coogler's Family Mediation Center
in Atlanta in the 1980s.l^ Coogler's book, Structured Mediation in Divorce
Settlement, ^^ was the first publication in this field and paved the way for establishing
family mediation centers all over the United States.
' Ellen A. Waldman, The Challenge of Certification: How to Ensure Mediator Competence while
Preserving Diversity, 30 U.S.F.L. Rev. 723 (1996).
° John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward F. Sherman, Processes of Dispute Resolution, the Role of
Lawyers, 296\297 (1996).
9 Id.
'^ Nancy Illman Meyers, Power (Im) Balance And The Failure Of Impartiality In Attorney - Mediated
Divorce, 27 U.Tol.L. Rev. 853, 854 (1996); Judith M. Wolf, Sex, Lies and Divorce Mediation, 33 - Nov
Ariz. Att'y 25 (1996).
'
' Ellen Waldman, The Role ofLegal Norms In Divorce Mediation, An Argumentfor Inclusion, Va. J.
Soc. Pol'y &L. 87(1993).
^2 O.J. Coogler, Structured Mediation in Divorce Settlement (1978).
4At present almost all states in the United States offer a public mediation service
that is closely connected to family courts, which ask divorcing couples to attend
mediation sessions either in voluntary or in mandatory formJ^ The creative approach of
Coogler was to bring divorcing parties together and to help them to reach an agreement
under the Marital Mediation Rules - guidelines that were substantially developed from
revised statutes that some states had established after the reform of the divorce law.'**
Coogler's rules, which offered a guideline for settlement of material issues, like marital
property and maintenance, have been basically adopted from existing domestic relations
statutes. ' 5
C) The traditional adversarial model and mediation - a comparative
analysis
The traditional litigation model views divorcing couples "as opponents",
whereas in the mediation process they are "joint - decision makers"J ^ Attorneys have
the role of "soldiers of fortune" in a war about money, property and custody, whereas
the mediator rather has the role of a diplomat. ^^ The mediation process promotes
communication between spouses and encourages cooperation instead of
'^ Susan Meyers et al.. Court Sponsored Mediation of Divorce, Custody, Visitation, and Support:
Resolving Policy Issues, St. Ct. J., Winter 1989, 25, Fn 6; Ellen Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms In
Divorce Mediation, An Argumentfor Inclusion, Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 88 (1993).
'^ Ellen Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms In Divorce Mediation, An Argument for Inclusion, Va. J.
Soc.Pol'y&L. 87, 93(1993).
'^ Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 8 Fam. L. Q.
369, 393 (1985); Ellen Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms In Divorce Mediation, An Argument for
Inclusion, Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 94 (1993).
'" Nancy lllman Meyers, Power (Im) Balance And The Failure OfImpartiality In Attorney - Mediated
Divorce, 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 853, 856 (1996).
'7 Id at 855; KENNETH KRESSEL, THE PROCESS OF DIVORCE: HOW PROFESSIONALS AND
COUPLES NEGOTIA TE SETTLEMENTS, 1 43 ( 1 985).
5confrontationJ 8 The adversary process is rather a "zero - sum game, one plus for you, is
one minus for me" and vice versa. ^^ The mediation process however is based on the
assumption that the marital pie can be enlarged: One plus for me can be one plus for
you, too. For example, in child custody cases, in which parents mediate cooperatively
and reach a fair solution, they benefit from this fair outcome which promotes the child's
well - being. In the mediation process the mediator assumes the parties take their lives
into their own hands and are able to tailor an arrangement that fits their personal needs
and allows creative problem solving.
In the traditional adversarial model (litigation or adversarial negotiation)
attorneys are the key figures, who communicate with each other and negotiate a
settlement rather than the parties^O who are affected by the outcome. In the litigation
process the judge makes a decision which is based on "normative predictions" 21 and
not adapted to the special needs and circumstances of divorcing couples. Because of
litigation's adversarial nature the lawyers focus on winning the game rather than trying
to reach a long - lasting solution that is fair and satisfying to both parties.22 This
"wirmer gets all" and "loser loses all" mentality, based on maximizing their own victory
is likely to enforce the polarization between the divorcing partners, which are already in
a hostile and non - cooperative mood by nature of the divorce situation, with which they
18 Id at 855; Daniel J. Guttman, For Better or Worse. Till ADR Do Us Part: Using Antenuptial
Agreements To Compel Alternatives To Traditional Adversarial Litigation, 12 Ohio St. on Disp. Resol.
175, 176 (1996); Lynn A. Kerbeshian, ADR: To Be Or...?, 70 N.D.L.Rev. 381, 386 (1994); Thomas J.
Stipanowich, The Quiet Revolution comes to Kentucky: A Case Study in Community Mediation, 81 Ky. L.
J. 855, 870(1993).
'" Carrie Menkel - Meadow, Toward Another View Of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving UCLA Law Review, Vol. 31:754, 765 (1984).
2" Nancy Illman Meyers, Power (Im) Balance And The Failure Of Impartiality In Attorney - Mediated
Divorce, 27 U.Tol.L. Rev. 853, 856 (1996).
21 Id. at 855; Steven C. Bowman, Idaho 's Decision on Divorce Mediation, 26 IDAHO L. REV. 547, 549
-550(1990).
22 Carrie Menkel - Meadow, Toward Another View Of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 31: 754, 765 (1984).
6are confronted.23 The basic assumption behind this adversarial concept is that both
divorcing parties have exactly the same goals, values, and interests and that a conflict
over the division of these limited resources is inevitable.^"^
When negotiating or litigating the issues of divorcing couples, lawyers and
parties in the adversarial model typically focus on one issue at a time, e.g., child
custody, maintenance or property division; consequently they fail to master polycentric
issues with more than one problem to solve. Because of the underlying assumption of
the adversarial model, that the resources of the divorcing couple are limited, parties tend
to take extreme positions during the negotiations, which leads to a polarization of
positions, with no opportunity to develop creative alternatives to complex issues. The
adversarial model intimidates parties, who principally would like to cooperate, by its
aggressive and one - sided approach to find a solution. Consequently, it leads to
increased hostility and suspicion and fails to result in an agreement satisfactory to both
parties.25 In divorce litigation, the strict rules of civil procedure, which narrow the
issues and outcome, are a far too formal approach to issues as complex as dissolving a
marriage, and therefore increase the social distance between judge and litigating
spouses.26
The mediator, on the other hand, accepts that individuals have their own values
and standards which influence their decision.27 It is not the task and the aim of the
mediator to reconcile adverse positions; rather the mediator promotes the discussion and
23 Terenia Urban Guill, A Framework For Understanding And Using ADR, 71 Tul. L. Rev. 1313, 1323
(1997).
2^ Carrie Menkel - Meadow, Toward Another View Of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 31:754, 765 (1984).
25/^.
2" Nancy Illman Meyers, Power (Im) Balance And The Failure Of Impartiality In Attorney- Mediated
Divorce, 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 853, 856 -58 (1996).
7agreement by creating a "supportive atmosphere", "classifying issues", "helping to
define the areas of conflict" and "helping to develop options for mutual agreement
together with the parties."^8
Consequently, he rarely considers the conflict presented to him as a zero - sum
game, but rather as a conflict with an open end, a pie that is not yet fixed, but can be
enlarged for both parties.^9 The mediator is not the representative of the mediating
parties, in contrast to an attorney in the traditional adversarial negotiation or litigation.
Because in the adversary process spouses in a divorce situation are considered to be
enemies or at least opponents, this process increases hostility between them.^^
Mediation, however focuses on the future relationship between the divorced couple and
a possible reconciliation rather than on the past behavior and misunderstandings
between the spouses. The role of emotions in mediation is considerably more important
than in the litigation process. Mediation is a "measure of emotional catharsis", ^ • which
is prohibited by the "procedural formality" of the traditional litigation process. In
mediation the primary goal is to reconcile emotions by providing a "therapeutic
approach" to the settlement discussions, however, without being marriage counseling.^^
Emotions can be expressed and parties are invited to work on personnel issues and
problems in their relationship.^3 Non - legal issues like promotion of communication^'*
among family members are important goals in family mediation, which should help to
28 Id. at 856; Stephen K. Erickson, ADR And Family Law, 12 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 5, 6 (1991).
29
Id.; John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward F. Sherman, Processes Of Dispute Resolution^ 117
(1996).
30 /J.
3' Nancy Illman Meyers, Power (Im) Balance And The Failure OfImpartiality In Attorney - Mediated
Divorce. 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 853, 857 (1996).
32 John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward F. Sherman, Processes OfDispute Resolution, 297 (1996).
33/^.
34m
8resolve the complex issues of child custody, property division, maintenance, alimony,
and future relationship in a smooth and open way, as well as help to tailor a flexible and
individual solution to the parties' needs. ^5
35 Joel M. Douglas, Lynn J. Maier, Bringing The Parties Apart, 49 SEP Disp.Resol.J. 29 (1994); Carrie
Menkel -Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes Of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute
Professionals, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1871, 1872 (1997).
CHAPTER II
THE MEDIA TION PROCESS
The mediator starts the discussion between the divorcing couple with
introductory remarks on the ahemative character of mediation,^^ the goals of this
process, the procedure to reach a settlement, the confidentiality issues and the costs of
this dispute resolution process. Furthermore he familiarizes the parties with basic rules,
which have to be accepted by them throughout the discussions and ensures his neutrality
as a mediator.^^
The parties begin the mediation process by defining and describing the post -
marital problems from their personal point of view and finally by setting an agenda to
solve these issues.^8 The task of the mediator at the beginning of the mediation session
is to gather all information necessary for him to provide the parties with the assistance
they need to reach an agreement. The discussions cover the reasons for the conflict, and
provide an opportunity to vent anger and frustration;^^ in addition the mediator helps
the parties to develop options to resolve complex post - marital issues.
After defining the issues parties analyze individual and common interests and
needs, as well as the issues that can be resolved by a compromise and others that they
have to give up'^O or at least postpone. However, the divorcing couple alone decides
^" John S. Murray, Alan S. Rau, & Edward F. Sherman, Dispute Resolution: Materials for Continuing
Legal Education 111-7-9 (National Institute for Dispute Resolution (1991)).
^ ' John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward F. Sherman. Processes OfDispute Resolution {\996).
38 /cy. at 302.
39/^.
40 m
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which issues are most important to each of them and discusses whether they can commit
to resolve these issues with mutual agreement."*'
The next step for them is to develop problem - solving options, discover
alternatives and possibilities of compromises to complex issues. The role of the
mediator at this stage is to facilitate the discussion, smooth difficulties in
communication, encourage the parties to lead a fair debate about the issues at hand, and
to assist them in bargaining and negotiating a final agreement by exploring the pros and
cons of the various solutions.'*^ The mediator can profit fi-om his experience with other
divorce cases and may help the couple to discover their individual resources to tailor a
solution, which is responsive to their individual needs.'*^
A) Two common settlement approaches in mediation
1) The Building Block Approach to Settlement^"*
The Building Block Approach to Settlement requires the mediator to fraction a
complex main issue, such as, post - marital situation into several sub - issues, which are
more manageable, e.g., child custody, maintenance, alimony, property division, fijture
relationship etc. The couple tries to find a solution to each sub - issue and in case they
cannot reach an agreement, the mediator simply draws their attention to another sub -
issue which might be easier to deal with.
The reason why mediators frequently use this settlement approach is that the
couple can handle complex issues easier when they are separated and disconnected to
prevent a blockade in discussion."*^ Especially when mediating parties can participate in
41
Id.
42
Id.
43 Id
44 Christopher W. Moore, The Mediation Process, 204 - 206, 212-216 (1986).
45 Moore, id. at 306.
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dividing the main issue and defining the sub - issues, the mediator can promote their
understanding of the settlement process and therefore more commitment to it.'*^
At the end, the several sub - issues or "blocks" to which parties could find a
solution are summed up to a whole settlement agreement, which can be drafted and
executed.
2) The Agreement in Principle Approach to Settlements^
The second common approach to settlement, the Agreement in Principle
Approach to Settlement requires the mediator to define bargaining principles and
general rules that will help to shape the final outcome in mediation.'*^ Instead of
fractioning a main issue into smaller sub - issues, the mediator first draws parties'
attention to their similarities and common interests, rather than their differences and
later works on the specific details.^^ Especially in cases, in which divorcing couples
have the same basic values and goals, the focus on similarities can be effective and
promote a successful discussion.^^
By using several settlement procedures during the mediation process the
mediator can include the parties into the process of option generation and separate this
stage of discussion fi-om the final stage of evaluating the agreement reached by the
parties.^ 1 The advantage of this separation is that parties have to open their minds and
reflect all options and alternatives that could settle their conflict without blocking the
mediation process by hasty judgments and rejections of alternatives.^^
46 Id.
47
Id. at 307.
48 Id
49 Id
50 Id
51 Id at 307 /308.
52 Id at 308.
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B) Common Techniques for Option - Generation
The most frequent techniques mediators use to generate options for settlement
are Brainstorming, Developing Hypothetical Plausible Scenarios, and Using Outside
Resources. ^^
1) Brainstorming
Brainstorming is a settlement procedure in which the mediator presents an
unsolved issue as a problem and asks the couple how a possible solution to this problem
might look.^"^ The parties then suggest a variety of alternative options, modify and
develop the suggestions of the other spouse and try to work on these ideas as long as
they can agree to a compromise solution.^^
Brainstorming can be conducted in a joint session of both spouses, but also in
caucus with the mediator if both spouses don't trust each other or feel insecure to
openly discuss alternatives that they first only want to communicate to the mediator in
order not to disclose too much information^^ to the other spouse.
2) Developing Hypothetical Plausible Scenarios
By developing hypothetical scenarios the mediator asks the spouses to suggest
options for settlement by describing possible hypothetical scenarios and what the
solution of a problem in practice could look like.^^ Parties have to analyze in detail,
what the "procedural, substantive, and psychological outcome" of the process would be
and how the spouses could master the way from the status - quo to the hypothetical
situation.^^ After the parties have brainstormed about the effects of each scenario, they
53 Id. at 308/ 09.
54 Id. at 308.
55/^.
56 Id at 308.
57 Id at 309.
58/^.
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begin to evaluate these outcomes by listing the pros and cons as well as possible
alternatives to improve this outcome. ^^
3) Using Outside Resources
Using outside resources is another successful means to focus parties' attention
on possible settlement options. Parties in mediation are often frustrated by the
subjective view of their problems and lack objective data to generate more options.^^
The mediator in these situations can encourage them to use outside resources, e.g.,
information by other experts, special literature on divorce issues, or simply to get in
touch with other divorced couples who had the same financial, custodial, or other post -
divorce issues to solve.^^ Attorneys, tax experts, and governmental officials can provide
additional useful information.^2 Eventually the mediator assists the parties in writing
the final agreement and often helps them in executing it.^^
In summary, the mediator is a neutral third party and not an advocate of
particular interests and goals. Therefore, he can help to change the usual social pattern
in a conflict relationship. He persuades the parties to give up extreme and unrealistic
goals and to cooperate instead of confi-onting the other side with extreme positions and
therefore provoke severe opposition and hostility.^"*
Unlike a litigated process or an attorney - led negotiation, the mediator leaves
the final decision on the outcome up to the parties, who have to adapt their lives to the
conditions agreed upon in the final settlement.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61 Mat 3 10.
62 Id
63 Mat 309/3 10.
64 Id at 307.
CHAPTER in
POWER IMBALANCEAND THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE
A) Power Imbalance in Divorce Cases - a General Overview
Inequality in bargaining power normally leads to inequality in the mediated
outcome.^^ The central question, however, is to analyze what is power and how it is
defined.
"Power held by one spouse in relation to the other represents the ability to
control resources, or the access to resources, that the other (spouse) wants or needs."^^
Or in other words power is "the possibility of imposing one's will upon the behavior of
other persons".^^ Feminist critique on the mediation process in divorce cases is based
on two potential dangers for the less powerful spouse. The first is to be taken advantage
of by the intellectually, economically or emotionally stronger spouse,^^ the second is
the danger of a strong and prejudiced mediator who defines his role as a neutral third
party but dominates the mediation process and imposes his own values on the spouse
with less self confidence, which according to these feminist critiques often happens to
be the female spouse.^^
"^ Scott Hughes, Elizabeth's Story: Exploring Power Imbalance In Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 553, 579(1995).
66 Hughes, id at 574.
67 MAX WEBER, LAW INECONOMYAND SOCIETY 323 ( 1 954).
6o Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, Wis. L. Rev. 1359, 1398 (1985); Ellen Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms In
Divorce Mediation: An Argumentfor Inclusion, 1 Va.J.Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 116 (1993).
6^ Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody
Decisionmaking, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 727, 765 - 68 (1988); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
14
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The different powers in a relationship are intellectual, physical, emotional and
procedural power.^^ Emotional power in a relationship means "the ability to control the
other partner through threats or intimidation".^' The more the threatened spouse is
unwilling to withdraw from the destructive influence and dissolve the relationship, the
more significant the threats and intimidation can become. The procedural power,
according to feminist critics, enables the more powerful spouse to control the process,
the length of a dispute, and its settlements^ ^y deciding on the evaluations and the
timing of the settlement process. ^^
The focus of the mediator in this situation of serious inequality in bargaining
power, therefore, must be on the possibilities to smooth these differences and prevent
seriously unequal outcomes. In the traditional adversarial process this issue is resolved
by procedural principles and rules, e.g., "the burden of proof and the "rules of
evidence", which can shift and balance power between unequally powerful parties^"*
The ways the neutral third party can effectively tackle this issue is to explain the
advantages of the mediation process to empower the weaker spouse. ^^ The mediation
process with its open discussions but firm ground rules of mutual respect is especially
Process Dangers for Women, 100 Yale L. J. 1545,1560 - 62, 1569-72 (1991); Eric Yamamoto, ADR:
Where Have The Critics Gone? 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1055, 1058-60 (1996).
'70 John R. P. French, Jr. & Bertram Raven, The Basis of Social Power, in STUDIES IN SOCIAL
POWER 150, 155-56 (1959); John M. Haynes, DIVORCE MEDIATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
THERAPISTS AND COUNSELORS 49, 277, 29 1 - 93 ( 1 98 1 ); Scott Hughes, Elizabeth 's Story: Exploring
Power Imbalance In Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 553, 575 (1995).
"7' Scott Hughes, /J. at 573.
"72
Id. at 575.
73 Id
"^^ Terenia Urban Guill, A Framework For Understanding And Using ADR, 71 Tul. L. Rev. 1313, 1325
(1997).
'^ Albie M. Davis, Richard A. Salem, Dealing with Power Imbalances in the Mediation ofInterpersonal
Disputes. MEDIATION QUARTERLY, No. 6 at 17-26 (December 1984) (10 pp.), taken from American
Bar Association, Family Law Section Special Committee on Dispute Resolution, DIVORCE
MEDIATION: READINGS 171, 172 ABA (1985).
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suited in cases of severe power imbaiance.^^ In these situations the mediator can model
the behavior he expects from the couple by listening carefully, treating each spouse with
respect, and considering carefully of what each party has to contribute to the mediation
process. This atmosphere empowers the spouse with a lower self esteem by respecting
her dignity7^ Furthermore the mediator has to remind the parties to use their own
intellectual capacity in evaluating the quality of an agreement, rather than relying on the
judgment of a lawyer or the judge in a court - litigation. Thereby the weaker spouse is
challenged to overcome her feelings of powerlessness and to take responsibility for her
own future. ^^
The power imbalance between spouses, however, does not necessarily lead to an
unequal outcome, as long as the more powerful spouse is ready to refrain from taking
advantage of the weaker spouse.^^ The motives for this altruism of the sfronger spouse
might be the interest in a good long - term relationship with his former partner and his
children. In this situation the power imbalance is not reflected in the final outcome of
mediation, but remains merely theoretical. ^^
In the majority of cases, however, the more powerful spouse exerts his influence
during the mediation process and finally reaches a settlement which mirrors the
inequality in bargaining power.^' The more equally the power between spouses is
divided, the more balanced the mediation process and final outcome will be.
76/^.
Illd.
"^^ Id at 113.
'^ Scott Hughes, Elizabeth 's Story: Exploring Power Imbalances In Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics, 553, 578(1995).
80 Id. at 578.
°' Id; Kelly Rowe, The Limits Of The Neighborhood Justice Center: Why Domestic Violence Cases
Should Not Be Mediated. Emory L. J. 855, 861-63 (1985).
17
Consequently the lack of a mechanism in mediation to balance the unequal power
normally disfavors the weaker spouse. ^2
To sum up the critique of feminist on the mediation process in divorce cases,
these authors assume that Alternative Dispute Resolution is a fair alternative to the
traditional adversarial model only if the bargaining power of a divorcing couple is
balanced. ^3 The traditional divorce litigation, with its strict application of procedural
and substantive law, is considered to be a highly necessary protection of the weaker
spouse who can easily be taken advantage of in the mediation process, in which the
neutral third party normally does not interfere in the discussion of the divorcing couple,
in order to enable them to make their own decisions. In a litigated process, according to
these feminist commentators, the weaker spouse would get fiill protection by her
attorney, who is necessarily partial and supportive, as well as the protection of a neutral
judge who makes his decision based on a normative basis, and not according to the
expression of power by the stronger spouse.
B) The Challenges in Mediating Divorce Cases
Commentators often assume that divorcing couples are not able to tackle
effectively the emotional, financial, and psychological problems linked with dissolving
a marriage.^'* The protection of one's own interests demands a personality which is
trained to deal with problems in an effective and sovereign way. However, as a "result
of abuse, inexperience",^^ and consequentially lack of self confidence, it is often hard
for women to define and protect own positions and interests.
82
Id. at 577; Gary L. Welton, Power Balancing, 105, 106 (1991).
83 Steven C. Bowman, Idaho's Decision On Divorce Mediation, 26 Idaho L. Rev. 547, 559 (1989).
°^ Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth's Story: Exploring Power Imbalances in Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 553, 562-63 (1995).
85 Terenia Urban Guill, A Framework For Understanding And Using ADR, 71 Tul. L. Rev. 1313, 1323
-26(1997).
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1) Mediation in divorce cases and the inequality of bargaining power
Well - known feminists like Trina Grillo and Penelope Bryan assume that
mediation is by its nature a threat to divorcing women, because it is based on the
assumption that both parties start the mediation discussions with equal power whereas
in reality women are permanently disfavored and therefore have no equal bargaining
power.^^ Women, according to these feminist critics of divorce mediation, are
disadvantaged against their male spouses psychologically, socially, legally, and
financially. 8^
a) Psychologically women in divorce situations are considered to be depressive,
less convinced to reach a solution to their post - marital problems by a tough and
adversarial conflict resolution, and more likely to compromise because of a lower self
esteem.^^ Frequently, due to this lower self esteem women in general tend to "fear
achieving" their aims and especially abused wives are emotionally completely
dependent on their husbands. ^^
b) Other reasons why women are frequently disfavored in negotiations are
differences in education, traditional roles,^^ and socialization.^^
Intellectual skills and educational background determine the outcome of a
negotiation. Even if normally men and women tend to marry a partner with a similar
educational background, in marriages with unequally educated spouses men usually
^^ Carol Lefcourt, Women, Mediation and Family Lmv, 18 Clearinghouse Rev. 267-69 (1984); Ellen
Waldman, The Role Of Legal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion, 1 Va.J.Soc.
Pol'y&L. 87, 115 - 19(1993).
°' Penelope Bryan, The Coercion of Women In Divorce Settlement Negotiation, Denver University Law
Review, Vol. 74:4, 931 (1997).
88 Id at 933.
Id.; M. Laurie Leitch, The Politics ofCompromise: A Feminist Perspective on Mediation, Mediation
Q., Winter 1986/ Spring 1987, 163, 169; Ellen Waldman, The Role Of Legal Norms In Divorce
Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion, 1 Va.J.Soc.Pol'y «& L. 87, 1 16 -19 (1993).
91 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice 10-11 (1982); Ellen Waldman, id at 1 17.
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have a superior education.^2 ^ higher education of the male spouse, especially in a
relevant field like legal rights and tax law, which is accessible for lawyers, consultants
and business people in general, but also basic educational training in negotiation,
accessible for salesperson, provides the spouse with a higher chance to get the bigger
piece of the marital pie.
Because men have greater access to tangible resources, they normally win the
negotiation game during mediation.^^ 7^^ probable emotional and psychological
dependency of husbands on their wives, which provides the female spouse with a
certain security of loyalty during the marriage loses its relevancy during the divorce
process. The power which might have been equal during marriage in a divorce situation
clearly shifts to the husband who can dominate the ex - spouse in negotiating divorce
issues.
Socially women are caregivers to children and husband; that means they have
from the very beginning of their marriage the tasks of self - sacrifice and service. ^^^
Women normally try to approach conflicts by cooperation and communication;^^ they
define their role more from exterior circumstances, e.g., the relations to other family
members, fiiends and colleges etc., than by an interior definition of themselves as
individuals.96 Their bargaining pattern, therefore, is basically cooperative and altruistic,
92 Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation And The Politics OfPower. 40 Buff. L. Rev.
441,451 (1992).
9^ Penelope E. Bryan, The Coercion Of Women in Divorce Settlement Negotiation, Denver University
Law Review, Vol. 74: 4, 931, 933 (1997); M. Laurie Leitch, The Politics of Compromise: A Feminist
Perspective on Mediation. Mediation Q., Winter 1986/Spring 1987, 163, 169; Ellen Waldman, The Role
OfLegal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion, 1 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 1 18 - 20
(1993).
95 Deborah M. Kolb & Gloria G. Coolidge, Her Place at the Table: A Consideration ofGender Issues in
Negotiation, in Negotiation Theory and Practice, 261, 266 (1991); Ellen Waldman, id. at 115.
96 Deborah M. Kolb & Gloria G. Coolidge, id at 264 (1991).
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focused more on joint than on "individual success",^^ whereas men tend to be
"individualistic" and "competitive",^^ demanding and assertive.
Another reason why women in a divorce situation are handicapped to freely
negotiate is their strong desire to keep custody of their children, which for most
mothers, used to the role of caregivers, is of vital importance for their self definition.^^
c) Some feminists even argue that divorce law, in special circumstances where
child custody is at stake, can become unfavorable for every woman trying to reach a fair
outcome in a negotiation with her spouse. The custody law of most states, with its vague
"best interest of the child" criteria for deciding custody issues and the lack of sufficient
and detailed statutes in child custody law, leaves a lot of space for clever husbands to
pursue high financial interests in a divorce situation and, advised by their legal experts,
to offer an exchange of child custody for more financial concessions by their wives. '^^
Furthermore the indefinite statutes on spousal maintenance law and the rhetoric
of "formal equality" of men and women in domestic relations pervades divorce law and
in the end favors men, who usually are already in a better economic position. ^^^ Since
normally it is the husband who earns the money or at least has a higher income than his
wife, fi-equently only he can afford to pay those highly specialized and excellent lawyers
who are best familiar with the advantages and deficiencies of family law and know how
to achieve the best financial outcome in a divorce negotiation.
d) Another reason why most women need a partial counselor in divorce
situations - an attorney and not a mediator - is their lack of financial know how and
^"7 Kolb & Coolidge, id. at 269.
Ellen Waldman, The Role ofLegal Norms in Divorce Mediation: An Argumentfor Inclusion, 1 Va. J.
Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 1 16 - 20 (1993).
"^ Penelope E. Bryan, The Coercion of Women In Divorce Negotiation, Denver University Law Review,
Vol. 74:4, 931,933(1997).
100 y^.
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consequently their long term financial interestsJ^^ Especially among low income
spouses, the financial responsibility and control of the income are often in the hand of
the male spouse and more than in any other social group women in low - income
marriages lack basic financial knowledge. Therefore they can be easily taken advantage
of in negotiations with their husbandsJ ^^
e) Closely related to the lack of financial knowledge is the fact that most women
still lack financial independence due to their lives as housewives. 'O'* Financially wives
and children are often dependent on the male spouse. Due to the ft^equent lack of a
personal income, women are often ready to agree to whatever settlement suggestion the
divorcing husband makes. Frequently women in lower social classes lack financial
security which would enable them to wait till a satisfactory outcome is reached. '"^^ This
phenomenon of "starving out'''^^ the female spouse to reach a better financial outcome
for the husband is widespread in divorce negotiation and intensifies the difficulties
wives have to deal with during the mediation session.
^^2 Ellen Waldman, The Role OfLegal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion, 1 Va.
J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 1 18 - 19 (1993).
^^^ Desmond Ellis, Marital Conflict Mediation and Post - Separation Wife Abuse, 8 Law & Ineq. J. 3 17
(1990).
^"^ M. Laurie Leitch, The Politics ofCompromise: A Feminist Perspective on Mediation, Mediation Q.
Winter 1986/ Spring 1987, at 163, 169.
Penelope E. Bryan, The Coercion Of Women in Divorce Negotiation, Denver University Law
Review, Vol. 74:4, 931 (1997); Howard S. Erlanger et al.. Participation and Flexibility in Informal
Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21 Law & Soc'y Rev. 585, 597 (1987); Ellen Waldman,
77?^ Role OfLegal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument for Inclusion, 1 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y L. 87,
119(1993).
'"" Penelope E. Bryan, The Coercion OfWomen in Divorce Negotation, Denver University Law Review,
Vol. 74:4,931(1997).
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2) Power as the access to tangible and intangible resources
Power, according to some feminist critics of mediation, is defined as the access
to tangible and intangible resources. '^^ According to them, men usually have the better
access to tangible resources as income, education, and profession, '^^ as well as
intangible resources as status and dominance, resulting from a higher self confidence
and self respect. '^^
a) Tangible Resources
The most important tangible resource of "income" enables the spouse with the
higher income to hire better experts who can tailor an agreement adapted to his interests
only. This spouse has the opportunity to very easily maximize his part of the marital pie
by diminishing the one of the other spouse. The general rule is that in the U.S. men have
by far higher incomes than women, performing the same job, and that 50% of the
married women have no earnings at all.' ^^
Finally, because most women define themselves as mothers and caretakers, they
often fall victims to "strategic bargaining". ' ' ^ Husbands, who are aware of the fact that
the majority of women would willingly give up other interests if they can keep child
custody, often take advantage of their ex wives and successfully reduce the amount of
child support and maintenance for "giving up" joint or sole custody.^ ^2 f^is scenario,
according to feminists who refuse mediation, is unlikely to occur in the traditional
'0*7 Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation And The Politics Of Power, 40 Buff. L.
Rev. 441,447 (1992).
108 m
109/^.
^^^Id at 447; JEAN LIPMAN-BLUMEN, GENDER ROLES AND POWER 163 (1984).
' 1 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute - Settlement and Rulemaking,
89 Harv. L. Rev. 637, 638 (1976); Ellen Waldman, The Role ofLegal Norms in Divorce Mediation: An
Argumentfor Inclusionm. Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 1 19 - 20 (1993).
' 12 Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3
Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 168, 177(1984).
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adversarial process in which the "best interest of the child" is frequently interpreted as
child custody for the mother.' ^^ Another group of feminists, however, refuses this
criteria as vague and disfavoring women.' ''^
b) Intangible Resources
Among the intangible resources "status and dominance" as positive resources
and
"depression" as negative resource have the most powerful impact on the divorce
negotiation itself and finally on the fairness of the outcome.' '^
Some intangible factors differ in each individual marriage, but not between
husbands and wives in general, e.g., intangible factors like guilt because of being the
one who suggested the break up, lack of self esteem caused by rejection and "risk
aversiveness"."^ However, other intangible factors do differ between husbands and
wives in general and determine the final outcome of the divorce negotiation.
The male spouse usually has a higher status than his wife, defined by a better
educational and financial background as well as his gender and "occupational rank". ' ' ^
The higher the status of a spouse, the more persuasive his authority, ' ' ^ and the better
and more subtle his influence on the weaker spouse."^ Women's usually lower status
in society is partly due to the smaller percentage of women with a profession other than
"^ Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome Study, in The Dark Side of Families: Current
Family Violence Research 3 1 , 42 - 43 ( 1 983).
^^^ See page 21/22 of this thesis.
115 Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation And The Politics Of Power, 40 Buff. L.
Rev. 441,457-71 (1992).
116 /J.
117W.
1 18 Alice H. Eagly, Gender and Social Influence, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 971 (1983).
ll^Eagly, /^.
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housewife. The higher status of men enables them to exert more influence on the
negotiation partner while women with their lesser status, are highly influenceable.'^O
The impact of status on male behavior is measurable in the extent of dominant
behavior toward the other spouse. On the other hand, the usually lower status of women
can cause a certain inferiority and inhibited reaction to an intimidating and dominant
approach of the male spouse during divorce negotiations. ^21
Depression : The lower status of women, combined with depression in a divorce
situation leads to a lower self esteem in negotiation. This lack of proper self confidence
finally can lead to the acceptance of an highly one - sided and unfavorable outcome, just
to maintain peace in an ongoing relationship. ^ 22 j\iq sources of gaining more self
esteem and respect (society, profession and environment) normally are outside of
women's daily life as housewives, except for the case, when women voluntarily prefer
to stay at home with their families. ^^3
Reward Expectation : The higher the goals and the aspiration the better normally
the outcome of a negotiation. 124 Women, because of their lower status in society and
the "structural and ideological inequality" ^ 25 qj^q generally satisfied with less than their
husbands. One reason for this lack of high aspiration is the tendency of women, based
120 Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Soflty: Divorce Mediation And The Politics Of Power. 40 Buff. L.
Rev. 441, 462 (1992); Alice H. Eagly, Sex Differences in Injluenceability, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 86 - 89
(1978); Alice H. Eagly, Gender and Social Influence, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 971, 976 - 977 (1983).
121 Penelope E. Bryan, id. at 465.
122 Mat 466 -75.
123 /J at 47 1-77.
124/^. at 475 -77.
125 John F. Stolte, The Legitimation of Structural Inequality: Reformulation and Test of the Self
-
Evaluation Argument, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 331, 332 (1983).
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on their social background, to compare themselves with other women rather than to
men. ^26
Fear of achievement : Although the mediation process by its nature is rather
cooperative than competitive, the distribution of limited resources can lead to a highly
competitive bargaining situation. ^ 27 in these situations, according to research, women
tend to be more accommodative, and compromising; instead of using the same
competitive negotiation strategies as their husbands, they tend to apply "facilitative"
dispute resolution styles. '28
In the majority of cases the more powerful spouse exerts his influence during the
mediation process and finally reaches a settlement which mirrors the inequality in the
bargaining power between ex - husband and wife, '29 whereas equal power usually
leads to fair outcomes. '^^
In contrast to the feminists who criticize the present divorce law for its
disadvantages for women,' 3' another group of feminist focuses on the character of
mediation as informal and outside of the traditional adversarial court litigation. '32 The
lack of an objective standard and control, measured by legal norms and secured by the
126 Penelope E. Bryan, id. at 475 - 77; Brenda Major & Blythe Forcey, Social Comparisons and Pay
Evaluations: Preferences for Same- Sex and Same - Job Wage Comparison, 2 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 393, 394 (1985).
'27 Penelope E. Bryan, id. at 477 - 81; Barbara J. Lonsdorf, Coercion: A Factor Affecting Women's
Inferior Outcome in Divorce, 3 AM. J. FAM. L. 281, 288 (1989).
'2o Penelope E. Bryan, id. at 478 - 81; Leonard H. Chusmir & Joan Mills, Gender Differences in
Conflict Resolution Styles ofManagers: At Work and At Home, 20 SEX ROLES 149, 151 (1989).
'2" Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth's Story: Exploring Power Imbalances In Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 553, 580-81 (1995).
'30 Id.; Gary L. Welton, Paties in Conflict: Their Characteristics and Perceptions, in COMMUNITY
MEDIA TION: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS AND RESEARCHERS, 1 05, 1 07 ( 1 99 1 ).
'3
' See above, page 21/22 of this thesis.
'32 Ellen Waldman, The Role ofLegal Norms in Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion.
1 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 1 15 (1993).
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judge as a neutral and powerful third person, would enable the stronger spouse to take
advantage of the unequal bargaining power. '33
These feminists argue that the mediation technique is contradictory to women's
rights and the acknowledgment of the "no - fault" divorce: '^^^ While judges and
legislators have recognized the importance of women's rights and are more and more
willing to change substantial and procedural law in favor of them, mediation by its
nature as an alternative dispute resolution method sets women outside of this safety
mechanism and intentionally disregards the parameters of legal rules. '^5
C) Power Imbalance and Mediation as a Solution
The feminist critique of mediation is justified in cases of severe abuse only.
Frequently, mediation as the cooperative and reconciling approach to solve problems
helps to smooth power imbalances by promoting communication of ideas and helping
parties to reduce tension and hostility. '^^ The procedural guidelines, which are often
provided for the mediation process itself, can help to equalize the bargaining position of
every party by giving them equal chances to define the issues and to contribute to
problem - solving. ' 37
Some methods of equalizing the power imbalance are to rearrange the seating
order to
prevent direct eye contact between the spouses, and to enable them just to have
eye
133 m
'34 Id.; Carol Lefcourt, Women, Mediation and Family Law, 18 Clearinghouse Rev. 269 (1984).
135Lefcourt, /J. at267-68.
'3o Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth's Story: Exploring Power Imbalances In Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 553, 581 (1995).
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contact with the mediator. '^^
Another method is to direct both parties to a blackboard on which the mediator
writes down the information they have gathered and reflects the progress the parties
have made. 13^ The mediation process can definitely become more equalized if the
mediator meets with both parties separately in caucus, '"^^ and allows the weaker spouse
to express freely her fears, anger and suspicion of unfairness. This approach has the
advantage to prevent the more powerful spouse from dominating the mediation process
by subtly or clearly making destructive comments. '"^^ Even if the effects of these
mediation tools on the emotional power imbalance are often only temporary, as long as
the parties are under the supervision of a neutral mediator, they are in a more or less
equal position, and the intellectual and physical power imbalance can be diminished. '^2
However, the important "emotional " power imbalance is far more difficult to
tackle because emotional fears, which are deeply rooted in one spouse's personality
cannot be diminished in a short process. ^'^^ After the mediation session ends the spouses
with severely unequal power tend to assume the roles they had played before they
started mediating their marital problems. Sometimes emotional barriers also lead to a
serious intellectual power imbalance, because the emotional blockade prevents the
weaker spouse from comprehending the information to which she has equal access. •'*'*
138 Id, at 579 - 81; JOHN BLADES, FAMILY MEDIATION: COOPERATIVE DIVORCE
SETTLEMENT, 40 (1985).
•39 Scott H. Hughes, id. at 580.
^^^ Christopher W. Moore, The Caucus: Private Meetings That Promote Settlement, 16 Mediation Q. 87,
89(1987).
''*' Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth's Story: Exploring Power Imbalances In Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 553, 579 - 80 (1995); Christopher Moore, id at 88-89.
142 Scott H. Hughes, id at 581.
l'*^/^ at 581.
144/^ at 581.
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Finally, it is critical to realize that even a mediator is limited in his abilities to
smooth long lasting power imbalances and that it would be naive to assume that
emotional equality between spouses can be achieved after emotional disturbances
caused by abuse and humiliation in the marital and post-marital relationship. '^^^
D) The Shift of Power
Whether economic, procedural, intellectual or psychological power, it is rarely
constant and static throughout a relationship or throughout the divorce mediation, but
often shifts fi-om one party to the other. ^^^
Factors, which influence the power distribution between the parties can be the
order, in which they present the main issues in the divorce process and their personal
point of view on the problems involved. ''^^ Another important factor for the power
distribution among the divorcing couple is the role of the mediator, and his and the
parties' ethnic identification.!'*^ Another reason why power can shift during mediation
is the sense of having been wrong in the past and the burden of guilt or simply the
deficiency in knowledge on a particular issue. ''^^
The power and its significant impact on the other party depends largely on how
power is perceived and reacted upon by the other spouse as well as this spouse's
145 m
146 William L.F. Felstiner & Austin W. Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and
Responsibility in Lawyer - Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1454 (1992); David A. Lax
& James K. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator 1 19 - 44 (1988).
147 Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the
Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev., 1317, 1336(1 995);
Janet Rifkin et al., Towawrd A New Discourse for Mediation: A Critique of Neutrality, 9 Mediation Q.
151 (1991).
148 Michele Hermann et al., The Metro Court Final Report, 137-48 (1993).
149 Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the
Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev., 1317, 1337 (1995).
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awareness of his or her power. ^ 5*^ Consequently, one efficient way for the weaker
spouse to withdraw from the overwhelming power of the other spouse is to learn to
perceive the own powerful resources and to use these resources to bring forward and
represent her own interests in the divorce mediation process.
E) Limits of Mediation in Divorce Cases
To avoid power imbalances that significantly contribute to an unequal outcome,
it is necessary to exclude certain categories of cases from mediation. Statutes in several
states concerning mediation and the limitations to it aim at protecting parties who are
highly vulnerable and unable to resist pressure exerted either by the mediator or by the
other spouse. ^^1 Examples of these categories are victims of domestic violence, patients
of mental health illnesses, or people who suffered from substantial abuse.
Furthermore, people who are substantially inferior in bargaining and asserting
their own interests should be excluded from the mediation program. ^^^ j]^q difficulties
in restricting mediation by excluding these cases from the mediation process are to
accurately predict whether a certain case involves a party susceptible to mediation
pressure or bargaining inferiority. ^^^
The difficulties in excluding domestic violence cases from the mediation process
even by statutes or court rules are diverse. The statutes aiming at excluding domestic
violence cases from mediation differentiate between "categorical prohibition", "case -
' ^" Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth 's Story: Exploring Power Imbalances in Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo. J.
LegalEthics, 553, 576(1995).
*^' Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring In The Lawyers: Challenging The
Dominant Approaches To Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1317, 1335 - 36
(1995).
'52 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. s 25-381.23 (West 1991); Garry J. Friedman, A Case OfAbuse. 221, 241 in: A
Guide to Divorce Mediation (1993).
'^•' Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring In The Lawyers: Challenging The
Dominant Approaches To Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation. 79 Minn. L.Rev. 1317, 1336 (1995).
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by case screening by the court" '^"^ and exclusion of the case by the judge, if a party
claims it and has a special proofJ ^^
1) Categorical Exclusion
Categorical exclusion of domestic violence cases from the mediation process
leads to an "underinclusion"'^^ of these cases, especially if these exclusions have to be
based on court pleadings only.^^^ Research of custody cases in Ohio and interviews
with couples in other states have shown that the percentage of people who admitted that
violence had occurred in their marriage was much higher when interviewed by
employees of the court than the percentage of people who alleged it in court
pleadings. '5^
Procedural difficulties imposed by legislators to prevent an overexclusion of
cases from the mediation process for fear of a misuse lead to a further reduction of
divorce cases which could be excluded from the mediation process. ^^^ Examples of
these procedural hurdles are that a mere report of violence is not sufficient ^^0, or that an
exclusion of a violence case from mediation is possible only if parties falsely alleging
domestic violence are threatened by a penalty of perjury. '6' These substantial and
^^'^ Okla. R. & Proc. for Disp. Resol. Act app. A, reported in Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, s 37 app. (West
1993).
155 N.C. Gen. Stat, s 50 - 13.1 © (Supp. 1994).
156 Craig Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging The
Dominant Approaches To Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1317, 1338 - 40
(1995).
•5/ Maine Court Mediation Serv., Mediation in Cases of Domestic Abuse: Helpful Option or
Unacceptable Risks, The Final Report ofthe Domestic Abuse and Mediation Project 26-29 (1992).
15o Jeanne Clement et al.. Descriptive Study of Children Whose Divorcing Parents Are Participating in
Voluntary, Mandatory or No Custody/Visitation Mediation 16, 20-21 (1993).
159 Craig Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging The
Dominant Approaches To Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1317, 1336 - 39
(1995).
160 Minn. Stat, s 518.619(2) (1994).
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procedural hurdles for an exclusion of domestic violence cases from the mediation
process enlarge the gap between the number of actual violence cases and those excluded
from mediation. ' ^2
On the other hand the categorical exclusion of cases from the mediation process
just on the basis of a party's statement can lead to the other extreme of "overexclusion"
of cases from the mediation processJ ^^ especially in cases where the presence and
assistance of lawyers can diminish the imbalance of power.
2) Individual Case Assessment
The individual case assessment is another possible means to balance power in
divorce mediation. However, it is not only costly and likely to delay the divorce process
but also highly probable to cause either over - or underexclusion of cases from the
mediation process.'^"* In addition the individual case assessment suffers from the same
insufficiency as the "categorical exclusion", because it is highly difficult to predict
whether substantial bargaining inequality in the individual case will cause inequality in
the outcome of the process, '^^ even though usually unequal power leads to unequal
outcomes.
3) Issue Limitation
This approach to reduce power imbalance in divorce mediation tries to tackle the
problem by separating economic from custodial issues. '^^ YhQ reason for this separation
is the assumption that linking economic and custodial issues in mediation can lead the
'^2 Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring In The Lawyers: Challenging The
Dominant Approaches To Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation, 1317, 1338 - 39 (1995).
163 Mat 1337.
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'"^ Linda Girdner, Mediation Triage: Screeningfor Spouse Abuse in Divorce Mediation, 1 Mediation Q.
365,376(1990).
16° Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring In The Lawyers: Challenging The
Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1317, 1340 (1995).
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more powerful parent to ask for more economic concessions before giving up ciiild
custody in exchange. '^^By separating these two issues during mediation commentators
assume that this "trade - off'^^^ can be prevented. In addition to the separation of issues,
critics underline that parties who are less familiar with legal issues can be taken
advantage of by the more informed, educated or experienced spouse. '^^
Some states have reacted to this inappropriate link between economic issues and
custodial issues by mandating mediation only for cases in which child custody matters
or visitation issues are excluded. ^^^ Other states have reacted by separating the
economic matters from the rest of divorce issues and by developing a special mediation
program for the sensitive issues of economic interests of spouses, which is led by
attorney-mediators only.^^^
However this "issue limitation" approach to balance power cannot be considered
as an overall solution. '^^ First, the statutes separating custodial and economic issues
actually cannot prevent the parties from linking them.^^^ In child custody cases it is
highly probable that mediation will, sooner or later, bring up the economic topic of
child support during child custody mediation. ^^'^
'"' Ann Milne, Mediation - A Promising Alternative for Family Courts, 1991 Juv. &. Fam.Cts. J.61, 68
(1991).
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Other critics point out that the financial obligations involved when deciding on
joint custody and the fact that often the mediator and the parties wrongfully assume
equal financial obligations in joint custody cases makes it doubtful whether you can
really separate these two issues. '^^
^"^^ Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers For Women. 100 Yale L.J. 1545, 1571 -
72(1991).
CHAPTER IV
THE ROLE OFLEGAL NORMS
As O. J. Coogler had already discovered in the beginning of the divorce
mediation movement, mediators should acquire basic legal knowledge, in addition to
their educational training in behavioral science. 1^^
Commentators on this issue often expect mediators to have legal training on the
issues of child support and maintenance, ^ ^^ to provide divorcing couples with a
comparison to the outcome in an adversarial court - litigation. Consequently parties
have the proper information to decide whether in their individual case mediation is the
more favorable dispute resolution method. ^^^ Legal norms in divorce mediation,
therefore, have the ftinction of providing a measurement'^^ for the quality of the
mediated outcome and to give the parties a guideline for negotiating divorce issues.
Some commentators even insist on a broader knowledge mediators should have on legal
issues, trial practice and procedure, as well as legal terminology, in order to enable them
to work with parties within the parameters of the legal system. '^^
'^^ O.J. Coogler, Structured Mediation in Divorce Settlement. 11 (1980).
John Allen Lemmon, Divorce Mediation: Optimal Scope and Practice Issues, Mediation Q.,
September 1983,45,48.
' ^^ Lemmon, id. at 5 1
.
*
'^ Daniel G. Brown, Divorce and Family Mediation: History, Review, Future Directions, Conciliation
Cts. Rev., December 1982, 1, 23 (1982).
*°^ Christopher W. Moore, Training Mediatorsfor Family Dispute Resolution^ Mediation Q., December
1983, at 79, 83-84.
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Other commentators and practitioners underline the alternative character of
mediation to the court - litigated process, which is necessarily based on legal norms: '^^
The different problem - solving approach in mediation, which allows parties to follow
their own perceptions ofjustice, instead of relying on a fixed assumption of who should
get which part of the marital pie, requires different guidelines than the legal norms. The
American Bar Association (ABA) Family Law Section Standards of Practice for
Family Mediators^^^ provides guidelines for divorce mediators to ensure that parties
have an appropriate base of legal information that can help them to tailor a solution
which is not beyond any "reasonable" standard. Furthermore, it requires mediators to
end the process if a fair and reasonable outcome in mediation is unlikely. '^^ These
standards don't have the quality of statutes and therefore lack binding character, but
they are established to influence the mediators in their practical work. However, they
are heavily criticized by both commentators and mediators, ' ^^ who consider them threat
to the alternative character of mediation.
John Lande was one of the most profiled critics of the ABA standards.
According to him mediation is based on cooperation and a personal conception of what
is just and fair.^^^ Legal norms, however, are means to handle a conflict in a competing,
adversarial dispute resolution like court litigated divorce. '^^ Mediation, according to
Lande, is based on the power and right of self - determination of each spouse. The
process itself is thereby the expression of the parties personal values and not an
181 M
'°2 ABA Family Law Section, Standards ofPractice for Family Mediators (1983), reprinted in 17 Fam.
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objective search for a fair outcome. '^^ Therefore the ABA standards, advising
mediators to terminate the process if the outcome obviously is unfair, are detrimental to
the objectives underlying the mediation process.' ^^ Lande maintains that "substantive
justice" requires the acknowledgment of parties' particular interests, purposes,'^^ and
philosophies of life, instead of imposing an objective system of values and prefabricated
"fair outcome" on them.
Other commentators point out that it is unproductive to impose legal norms on
mediating spouses because they distract parties and mediators from the central issue of
the Alternative Dispute Resolution, namely the difference in approach not only in the
process but also in the outcome of mediation. '^^
Another approach to evaluate the role of legal norms in mediation denies even
this "instrumental value" of legal norms in divorce mediation. '^^ Commentators who
appreciate the role of mediators as mere facilitators of a discussion among divorcing
couples and the mediation process as the search for an agreement that reflects best both
parties particular needs and interests reject legal norms for their "arbitrary and
divisive" '^^character. Instead of allowing the parties to meet their personal needs and
tailor a specific and individual solution, legal norms would invite them to speculate over
a potential outcome in a subsequent litigation. '^^ In the adversarial process, it is the
'^^ Lande, /c/. at 36.
'^^Lande, id. at37.
'"^ Nichol M. Schoenfield, TurfBattles And Professional Biases: An Analysis OfMediator Qulifications
in Child Custody Disputes, 1 1 Ohio St. J. On Disp. Resol. 469, 474 - 75 (1996).
'"' Ellen Waldman, The Role ofLegal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argumentfor Inclusion. 1 Va. J.
Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 96 - 99 (1993).
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lawyer who communicates to his client what is fair according to the law, whereas in the
mediation process the parties are their own interpreters of fairness. '^^
Other commentators point out that legal norms are too static and rigid to offer
solutions for complex and multi -layered psychological concerns and other problems in
the divorce process. '^^ A complex system like the family cannot be analyzed and
intervened into by a strictly rational and logical legal concept '^^ but understood only
when the mediator stops categorizing the problems into a prefabricated order.
As another critic points out, the legal system is based on the perception that you
can achieve absolute justice and that for every wrong there is a just remedy. '^^
However, mediation represents the notion of "situational or relational fairness" '^^
Justice is what the parties perceive to be just, which is the notion of individually
perceived justice.
A very free concept of mediation provides the mediator with the right to judge
whether and how much of the legal system he wants to introduce to the parties. ^^^
According to these commentators, it is up to the mediator in every individual case to
decide whether the knowledge of legal norms would be a facilitator in the discussion.
'^'* Stephen K. Erickson, The Legal Dimension ofDivorce Mediation, in Divorce Mediation: Theory and
Practice. 105-06(1988).
'"^ Robert D. Benjamin, The Physics of Mediation: Reflections of Scientific Theory in Professional
Mediation Practice, 8 Mediation Q. 91-92 (1990).
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A) The Two - Tiered ModepOO -
Mediation as combination of legal and psychological help
This model is based on the assumption that divorcing parties not only need legal
advice in mediation, but that each spouse should seek legal counseling in addition to the
help provided within the mediation process.^O' The outside counsel does not assist each
party during the mediation session, but he counsels his clients after an agreement in
mediation is reached and provides him with the comparison between the mediated
outcome and a potential subsequent court - litigated dispute.202 Attorneys, assisting
parties after the mediation process offer a final check and "safety net"203 against being
taken advantage of by the other spouse or prejudiced mediators and thereby reduce the
danger of a seriously unequal outcome, that might tempt the "losing" spouse not to keep
her promise that she made in the mediated settlement.204
Even though the involvement of attorneys in the mediation process is hotly
disputed, the basic idea of the two - tiered model appears in different standards to
regulate mediation, e.g., the Standards of the Association of Family and Conciliation
Courts (AFCC), the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the American Bar
^"^ Ellen Waldman, The Role ofLegal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion, 1 Va.
J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 99 - 101 (1993).
2^' Id.; Alison E. Gerencser, Family Mediation: Screening For Domestic Abuse, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
43, 62 (1996); Craig Mc Ewen & Nancy H. Rogers, "Bring the Lawyers into Divorce Mediation", 101 -
SP - RESOL. 8 (1994); Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth's Story: Exploring Power Imbalances In Divorce
Mediation, 8 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 553, 594 - 95 (1995).
202 Steven C. Bowman, Idaho's Decision On Divorce Mediation, 26 Idaho L. Rev. 547, 555 - 57
(1989); Russell M. Coombs, Noncourt - Connected Mediation and Counseling in Child - Custody
Disputes, 17 FAM. L. Q. 469, 471 (1984); Hugh Mclsaac, The Role ofthe Attorney in Resolving Custody
Disputes, Conciliation Cts. Rev., December 1988, at 9, 12.
203 Ellen Waldman, The Role ofLegal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion, 1 Va.
J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 102 (1993).
204 Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth's Story: Exploring Power Imbalances In Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 553, 594 - 95 (1995).
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Association (ABA) Family Law Section standards set up for family mediation
cases.205
The AFCC model standards of 1984 advise mediators to check the limits of their
professional education and to recommend to their clients additional legal help by an
outside attorney.206 Especially in cases in which legal rights and obligations might have
an impact on the outcome in mediation, mediators are asked to encourage their clients to
seek professional legal assistance prior to settling the issue.207 The AAA model
standards additionally encourage to lead legal discussions in a forum outside of the
mediation program itself whenever legal problems arise.208 Consequently, the
American Arbitration Association in its Family Mediation Rules supports the Two -
Tiered Model of an independent legal counsel outside of the mediation process itself.209
The most detailed model standards, set up by the ABA Family Law Section,
point out that parties should seek independent attorney assistance during the whole
mediation process, and not only if legal problems arise or an agreement has to be
drafted.210 The family and divorce mediators are encouraged to recommend that their
clients seek professional legal help from the very beginning of a mediation process and
especially before they agree to any outcome in the mediation session.2 1
1
2"^ Ellen Waldman, The Role ofLegal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion, 1 Va.
J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 102(1993).
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This Two - Tiered Model of mediation with an additional legal counseling has
been widely accepted in the publications on mediation2l2 and the public institutional
practice,2l3 as well as private^''* and court - affiliated^l^ mediation centers.216 xhe
outside counsel is considered to be a guarantee or at least a security means against
prejudiced, or inexperienced, or simply bad mediators and guarantees that every spouse
will have a basic understanding of his or her legal rights and obligations before she
commits to a mediated long - term agreement.217
The Two - Tiered Model is based on the assumption that even though mediation
is the expression of parties' autonomy and control over the settlement process, they
need, or at least should be advised to seek, legal assistance from an advocate who is
partial and gives them advice based on the personal interests and goals of each
spouse.218 Thereby the Two - Tiered Model tries to combine the advantages of
mediation with the traditional adversarial negotiation model. The underlying idea is that
only a party who is well informed about her legal rights and obligations can be an
autonomous and serious partner for mediating a long term agreement in a cooperative
and problem solving way.
2 '2 Russell M. Coombs, Noncourt - Connected Mediation and Counseling in Child - Custody Disputes,
IVFam. L. Q.469,489(1984).
^^^ Ellen A. Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion, 1
Va.J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 103 - 107 (1993).
2'^ Henry M. Elson, Setting Up a Private "Mediation" Practice, in Alternative Means ofFamily Dispute
Resolution, 1 73, 1 78 - 79 ( 1 982).
2'^ James C. Melamed, New Oregon House Bill 2225, in ABA Standing Comm. On Dispute Resolution,
Family Dispute Resolution Optionsfor All Ages 147, 149.
2*" Ellen A. Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion, 1
Va.J. Soc. Pol'y &. L. 87, 103 - 107 (1993).
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and Comments. 17 Fam. L. Q. 46, 467-68 (1984);
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However, the advantage of this combined model is at the same time a major
point of criticism. Commentators see the role of attorneys in the Two - Tiered model as
being the "watchdogs",219 who have to provide a guarantee against bad mediators. They
consider this model as damaging to the reputation of mediators, who should be well
trained to consider each party's rights without being partial.^20 Mediators, according to
the critics, should be able to inform their clients about the basic legal norms that affect
their case and should not be encouraged to delegate responsibility for a fair outcome to
an outside legal counsel22l
B) Inclusion of Legal Norms into the Mediation Process
The "Inclusion of Legal Norms into the Mediation Process" model is based on
the assumption that mediators will acquire the basic knowledge of legal rules and
concepts necessary for them to provide a fiilly satisfactory service to the divorcing
couple.222 Because mediator ftmctions range from gathering facts, and helping parties
to brainstorm and work on potential solutions to evaluating these options and drafting of
parties' final agreement,223 mediators are better able to meet these demands if they are
familiar with family law, precedent cases and procedural law.224 xhe knowledge of tax
law, for example, can help the mediator to suggest a favorable property division or other
219 m
220m
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financial transactions.225 By exploring different options to divide the limited resources,
the couple can enlarge "the marital pie"226 and thereby reduce the financial burden that
both partners have to carry after divorce. The categorization of financial support decides
which tax law will apply to the case.227 Furthermore, the decision of who will keep the
marital property is important for the capital gains taxes228 that will have to be paid by
the "favored" spouse. Especially in divorce cases, where couples have highly disparate
incomes, the division and distribution of property and other financial resources can
seriously affect the tax consequences.229
Regarding non - financial issues in divorce cases, such as custodial
arrangements, a mediator's knowledge of family law or of creative solutions that courts
or attorneys have suggested for frequent problems, can be of vital importance.230
The classic dispute between divorcing couples, the child custody issue, can be
solved by suggesting different "levels of participation"23 1 of the non - custodial parent
in the upbringing of the child.232 One option to let the non - custodial parent participate
in the child's life is to make important decisions concerning the education or medical
treatment of the child jointly,233 while minor decisions don't need the involvement of
the non - custodial parent.234
225 Ellen A. Waldman, The Role OfLegal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion, 1
Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 107 -1 10 (1993).
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Finally, a consideration of the likely results of judicial review of mediated
settlements can help parties and mediators save time and money by negotiating what is
realistic and will be accepted by the judge after mediation is finished.235
Different from the Two - Tiered Model, the supporters of the inclusion of legal
norms into the mediation process strictly reject the involvement of outside attorneys in
the mediation process.^^6 ^ mediator who has to interrupt the mediation process every
time a legal issue arises risks the success of the whole process and renders a disservice
to his clients.237 Instead of a continuous and informed negotiation he offers a series of
interrupted discussions.238
Finally, the knowledge of legal principles and concepts can also help the
mediator to overcome obstacles, if the mediation process is stuck and both parties refuse
to compromise on certain issues.239 As the classic theory of "principled negotiation"240
points out, this situation asks for the application of objective criteria. If both spouses are
unwilling to agree on a certain custodial or financial agreement, the mediator can
promote communication by referring to the legal positions of both spouses in a court -
litigated divorce process.
The knowledge of the parties' BATNA (Best Alternative To A Negotiated
Agreement) or their WATNA (Worst Alternative To A Negotiated Agreement)241 can
promote further negotiations in the mediation process, because both divorcing spouses
know the facts to decide whether the continuation of mediation is more favorable to
235 M
236m
237 w.
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litigation in court or whether they could get more of the "marital pie" by relying on the
legal system, rather than tailoring their own solution.
Supporters of this last theory underline that well informed mediators can best
balance power between spouses during the mediation process.242 Jq prevent the
intellectually or emotionally stronger spouse from dominating the weaker partner, the
mediator has to be familiar with legal norms, precedent divorce cases and court
decisions, as well as with legislative plans with potential influence on the actual divorce
case.243
Whereas the legally trained mediator can support the weaker spouse and provide
the necessary information to balance the power between the divorcing husband and
wife, the review of a drafted settlement by an attorney only after the parties have come
to an agreement provokes legitimate criticism by feminists^'*^ ^^^t i)^[^ method is
informal and outside of the traditional adversarial court - litigation.245
C) The Third Model
The advocates of the "Third Model" suggest the participation of lawyers in
every mediation session for reducing existing power imbalances between divorcing
spouses.246 These "third model" advocates object to the legal regulation of the
2^+2 Ellen A. Waldman, The Challenge Of Certification: How to Ensure Mediator Competence While
Preserving Diversity, 30 U.S.F.L. Rev. 723, 738 - 40 (1996).
^'^^ Ellen A. Waldman, The Role OfLegal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion. 1
Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 107 - 1 15 (1993).
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Mediation, 81 Ky. L. J. 855, 903 (1993).
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mediation process because of its "rigid and categorical obligations",^^^^ which lead to
inflexible outcomes. In addition, the presence of both lawyers and mediators adds
unnecessarily high costs.248
1) The regulatory approach
The regulatory approach of mediation is based on the participation of lawyers in
the mediation process and is a contribution to more fairness among the parties.249 More
lawyer participation can be achieved by legal rules, which abolish the exclusion of
lawyers from the mediation process and encourage their participation by increasing the
variety of topics to be discussed in the mediation session, such as property division,
alimony, maintenance and other financial issues, which make legal advice necessary .250
Another contribution to increasing fairness in mandated mediation sessions is
the inclusion of "court review of mediated agreements", as well as the exclusion of the
mediator's recommendation to the court. The fairness concerns in mandatory mediation
can be met by increased lawyer participation or the "judicial review of agreements", and
the exclusion of pressure on the parties to reach an agreement.251 By lawyer presence in
the mediation process, added by the modification of some ground rules, the power
imbalance between spouses can be met effectively.252 xhe unpredictable and often
changing circumstances during the divorce process which can lead to unpredictable
power changes can also be met effectively by the presence of lawyers who can balance
247 Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring In The Lawyers: Challenging The
Dominant Approaches To Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L.Rev. 1317, 1376 - 78
(1995).
248 m
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250 Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring In The Lawyers: Challenging The
Dominant Approaches To Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation. 79 Minn.L.Rev. 1317, 1375 (1995).
251 M
252 Joel M. Douglas, Lynn J. Maier, Bringing The Parties Apart, 49 - SEP Disp. Resol. J. 29, 33 (1994).
46
and offer assistance when these unforeseen changes happen.253 Even in situations in
which one spouse largely dominates the process, the presence of a powerful
"spokesperson" for the weaker spouse can increase the fairness of the discussion. -^'^ In
domestic violence cases the lawyers can prevent or at least diminish a direct encounter
with the abusing spouse and thereby largely prevent an unfair discussion.255
Some effective means used by lawyers in these abuse cases are to separate the
parties and to deal with each one alone by allowing generous "time outs"256 i^ cases of
past abuse, lawyers can warn their clients against agreements that are too one sided, or
simply not very likely to be upheld and followed over a long period.^57
When lawyer attendance during mediation is guaranteed, the difficult approach
of "issue limitation" to meet the power imbalance becomes unnecessary: The danger
that the powerful party links several different issues such as child custody in exchange
for a more favorable economic outcome, is excluded because lawyers can effectively
advise on these issues.258 xhe absence of lawyers in mediation often leaves the parties
alone with a mediator who is not legally trained and cannot discover unfair and one
sided settlements.259 Lawyers have to compensate for weak mediators.260
253 Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring In The Lawyers: Challenging The
Dominant Approaches To Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L.Rev. 1317, 1 376 ( 1 995).
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2) The "Voluntary Participation" approach
In the voluntary participation approach the assistance of lawyers in the
mediation process is not mandatory but possible.261 In this approach, however, lawyers
face the daunting task of predicting difficulties and unfairness in the individual process,
and attending only those sessions where problems are anticipated. Because these
predictions can be false, the "voluntary participation" approach is very risky.262
Voluntary participation of lawyers can also lead to increased costs, if parties are
responsible for paying the fees. As a study in Ohio has proven, mediation in these cases
is a dispute resolution method for wealthy couples only.263
3) Critics of the "Lawyer - Participating" approach in mandatory mediation
The critics of mandatory mediation vyith regulated lawyer participation target
diverse issues.264 When mediation is mandated, is there any difference from the
traditional lawyer- lead negotiation? Critics of lawyer - participated mediation question
whether this kind of mediation really differs from the traditional negotiation lead by
lavyyers. Many attorneys, however, underline the positive contribution of mediation to
the traditionally negotiated process265 because it leads to more efficiency, smoothes the
difficulties in communication, provides parties with the opportunity to get involved in
the settlement process266 and influences it actively.267
2"' Id at 1347; Andre G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation For Battered Women, 15
Harv. Women's L. J. 272, 272-73 (1992).
262 M
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By bringing both parties together for discussion of their issues, the normally
very long procedure of settlement negotiations can be shortened^^^ because the
conciliatory approach of mediation diminishes the confrontation which is inherent in
every adversarial dispute resolution.
In summary, the participation of lawyers in mediation helps both the parties and
the lawyers. Often parties in a lawyer - lead negotiation feel ignored, not informed about
the latest development,269 and mere observers of their own cases, waiting for the
attorneys to shape the outcome. In mediation the lawyer gets in touch with the opposite
party herself and gets direct information, which might be neglected or hidden in
negotiation with the opposite attomey.^^Oin addition, the discussion with the opposite
party gives the lawyer a new, more objective view on his own client's story; he can
reevaluate this story and add or correct some facts that his client might have omitted
purposefully or simply forgotten to mention.^^l
It is not only the lawyer but also the client who profits from the direct contact
with the opposite party. The parties not only have the opportunity to communicate with
the other spouse, which is the essential idea of mediation versus litigation, but they also
get the opportunity to talk to the opposite counsel. As many divorce clients have
reported, this opportunity to talk directly to the other party's advocate gives them the
sense of "telling their story" to someone "official".2'72
26° Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring In The Lawyers: Challenging The
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A long - term effect on lawyers by bringing them into the mediation process is to
improve their poor reputation and their behavior, which is often considered to be
uncompromising and confrontational.^^S
4) Does self - determination of parties in the mediation process necessarily
exclude lawyer participation?
Lawyer participated mandator)' mediation can conflict with the goal of self -
determination of clients. Mandated mediation cases become an unwanted hurdle before
litigation in court, which parties sometimes might favor.2'74 still mandated mediation
has many advantages in comparison to the voluntary approach, one of which is that
parties in mandated mediation are required to think independently about the issues of
their case, what goals they pursue, and whether these goals are realistic.^^S
5) Does mandated lawyer participation lead to increased costs of the mediation
process? One of the main concerns resulting from lawyer - participation in mediation
sessions is the possibility of increased costs,2'76 whereas mediation has the reputation of
a low cost dispute resolution method.
According to one research study, lawyers disagree about the cost of attorney
participation in mediation.2'77 Some interviewees underline that mediation session costs
can be reduced if the session does not cover all divorce issues^^S and the lawyers help
to tackle issues early in the mediation process.2'79
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In addition, many parties, even without mandated lawyer - presence, at some
stage of the mediation process, need legal counseling, which only lawyers can provide,
and which can tremendously increase the costs parties have to cover after mediation, if
this consultation is given by lawyers outside of the mediation process. 280 Another
significant advantage of lawyer - attended mediation is that courts have a lesser burden
to analyze and evaluate cases before assigning them to be mediated.28I These
procedures involve party attendance and sometimes attorney participation.282 On the
other hand, lawyers assisting in the mediation process make legal assessment of the
mediated outcome unnecessary. Even if the parties in the mediation process cannot
agree to a settlement, the participation of lawyers can help to analyze the problems,
define issues and thereby help the parties and judges in a litigated process after
mediation has failed.283 Mandated mediation is, therefore, not an additional hurdle to
litigation, but a significant factor which changes the structure of the traditional litigation
in court substantially by providing more efficiency and decreasing costs.284 in
summary, research suggests mandatory mediation assisted by lawyers does not lead to
higher costs,285 but even after an unsuccessful mediation paves the way for a fast and
efficient litigation in court.
It is time - effective286 and at least not more expensive than mediation with a
post- mediation lawyer participation. The difference fi"om the mediation cases without
lawyer participation is only that in the former cases the fees that parties accrue in the
280;^
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divorce process, are shared between mediator and lawyer.^^'^ Finally, mediators, who
normally have no law degree, often need the assistance of legally trained experts, who
can help to balance the power between parties and thereby contribute to more fairness in
the divorce process.288
D) Mediation in Child Custody Disputes
Critics of the traditional adversarial model have increasingly highlighted failures
of this model in the sensitive child custody issue because it increases conflicts and
hostility between parents, which have devastating effects upon the child's well -
being.289
In contrast, the mediation alternative is less formalized and more focused on the
individual cases than on the setting or analyzing of rules.^^O Therefore, non-economic
interests of the disputants, their emotional well - being, especially in the post-divorce
period and the long-term relationship among parents and children are much more in the
center of the mediation process than in the traditional adversarial concept.291
Another advantage of mediation in child custody disputes is the involvement of
mental health professionals that are sensitive to the emotional difficulties divorcing
parents have in communicating with each other about child custody. One hotly disputed
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issue is whether legal or mental health experts are the better mediators in child custody
disputes.
1) Attorneys as mediators in child custody disputes
Attorney - mediators haye the role of neutral third parties, who consciously
refrain from taking sides with one party.292 Howeyer, attorney - mediators can be
classified into two distinct groups, those who counsel both parties and those who give
legal adyice to neither. The first group of attorney - mediators simply explains to the
parties whether or not they considered their adverse claims and interests as realistic
under the presuppositions established by law.
The second group views their role as a mere neutral third party, who gives no
legal advice during the mediation process at all, but has only the function to stimulate
and facilitate discussion between the ex - spouses on a rational basis. Often these
mediators advise both parties to have legal counseling outside the mediation process.293
2) The advantages of an attorney - mediators in child custody cases
The major advantage which attorney - mediators have in contrast to mediators
without a legal education is the possibility of advising parties or at least informing
them294 about legal issues of child custody, to review the final settlement after
mediation295 and ensure more confidentiality than can be offered by non - lawyer
mediation.296
292/^. at 470 -71.
2"^ Russell M. Coombs, Noncourt - Connected Mediation and Counseling in Child- Custody Disputes,
17FAM. L. Q.469,475(1984).
294 iviary Pat Treuthart, In Harm 's Way? Family Mediation and the Role of the Attorney Advocate, 23
GOLDEN GATE U.L.REV. 717, 742 (1993).
295 Nichol M. Schoenfield, Turf Battles And Professional Biases: An Analysis Of Mediator
Qualifications In Child Custody Disputes, 1 1 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 469, 470 - 71 (1996).
296 Russell M. Coombs, Noncourt - Connected Mediation and Counseling in Child - Custody Disputes,
17 FAM.L.Q. 469, 491(1984).
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In child custody cases the lawyer - mediators can point out the legal rights that
spouses have under the law of the state and the legal meaning of an agreement on child
custody.297 Informed about their legal situation parties in a divorce process can better
decide which their starting position in negotiation is and whether it is worth insisting on
positions and goals which are legally not realistic.^^S
Finally, if parties are informed about their legal rights, the probability that they
will accept the final custodial outcome over a long term and act according to their
obligations is much higher than if they finally discover that they would have gained a
much better arrangement by litigating the child custody issue.299 a major advantage of
having an attorney mediating the divorce case is the likelihood that an agreement
reached by the parties will be accepted by the courts in the final divorce decree. Parties
will not waste time negotiating on an agreement that has no chance to survive the final
judicial review.^OO Additionally, despite the non - therapeutic nature of mediation, its
parties have a better opportunity to vent anger and let steam off than in litigation.
However, this approach is not aimed at dealing with psychological problems; rather it
favors an external data gathering and dispute resolution, an aim attorneys are more
familiar with than many other experts.^Ol Finally, the confidentiality of clients' data is
more ensured with lawyer - mediators, who have ethical responsibilities towards their
clients, than with other professionals.302
297 m
298 Susan C. Kuhn, Comment: Mandatory Mediation: California Civil Code Section 4607. 33 EMORY
L.J. 733,766(1984).
299 Kuhn, id.
300 Nichol M. Schoenfield, Turf Battles And Professional Biases: An Analysis Of Mediator
Qualifications In Child Custody Disputes. 1 1 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 469, 472 - 73 (1996).
301 Id
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3) Dangers of lawyer - mediators in child custody disputes
There are, however, some weak points attorney - mediators might have in
contrast to other experts as mediators in child custody cases. ^03 xhe mediation process
has the inherent nature of reconciliation rather than of confrontation while legal
education is traditionally based on the adversarial problem solving method, which is
detrimental to the cooperative problem - solving approach in mediation.^^^
Another risk which might arise from the adversarial system is the increase of
power imbalance, if it had already existed in the marital relationship. 305 a lawyer -
mediator, due to his training in the adversarial dispute resolution method, may be less
likely than a non - lawyer to discover these imbalances, and to help the weaker spouse
to define and assert her position. Especially in child custody disputes critics emphasize
the tendency of lawyers to ignore the emotional difficulties of their clients and to focus
on facts and exterior problems more than on the emotions involved when fighting over a
child.306 According to this opinion, lawyers are much more interested in reaching an
agreement that they can take to court for approval than getting involved in unresolved
and complex emotional issues.^O^
However, many lawyers' lack in psychological training or behavioral science is
not necessarily a hurdle to become a good mediator. The aim of mediation is not to
reconcile the parties but to work in a fair atmosphere and to find a balanced agreement
that both parties can live with.308 Family lawyers usually possess the skills necessary to
303 Id. at 474.
304 m
305 m
306 m
•^0
' Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody
Decisionmaking. HARV. L. PIEV. 727, 757 (1988).
308 Nichol M. Schoenfield, TurfBattles And Professional Biases: An Analysis OfMediator Qualification
in Child Custody Disputes. 1 1 Ohio St. J. On Disp. Resol. 469, 476 - 77 (1996).
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mediate child custody disputes, namely a good knowledge of people, well developed
and convincing counseling ability and a sense of what is realistic in a negotiation.^^^
The lack of psychological skills, however, is a serious argument as far as the power
imbalance between spouses is concerned. Lawyers are often so concerned with reaching
a settlement and increasing their reputation as being successful counselors, that they
may fail to recognize the weaker position of one party - and worse, they may recognize
but ignore it when the proper course may have been to terminate the mediation session
and advise the weaker spouse to start a court - litigation.^'^
E) The regulation of mediation in Georgia - statutes and rules
Courts all over the U.S. have recognized the significance of ADR. However the
statutes set up by the states to regulate the mediation process, the selection of mediators,
and their responsibility are quite diverse.
Georgia has a widespread use of Alternative Dispute Resolution, especially
mediation.^!! In 1992 the Supreme Court of Georgia adopted the recommendations of
the Joint Commission on ADR giving every trial court the possibility to employ ADR
processes.^ 12 Yh^ courts however developed their own program, which refers only
certain types of cases to ADR and sets up a certain type of ADR - procedure for these
cases. 31^
30^ Lawrence D. Gaughan, Divorce Mediation: An Important New Role for Lawyers, VA. B.A.J.,
Summer 1986, at 10.
310 Leonard L.Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 40 (1982).
311 Peter S. Chantilis, Mediation U.S.A., 26 U. Mem. L. Rev., 1031, 1045 - (1996).
312 jd at 1045; Melissa Lee Himes, Georgia Court - Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution Act:
Create and Fund Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs in Each Country in Georgia^ 10 Ga. St. U. L.
Rev. 91 (1993).
313 Chantilis, /£/.
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Furthermore the Supreme Court founded the Georgia Commission on Dispute
Resolution.^''* This commission set up standards for the qualification of neutrals as
mediators in the court - administered program.315 xhe requirement basically consists of
a theoretical training and observation of a mediation process in domestic relations.
Family mediators need a training of 45 hours.^'^ For becoming a mediator in divorce
and custody cases a special additional training in domestic violence is required.
The courts in Georgia are provided with special model mediation rules as
guidelines.3'^ Remarkably Georgia is the only state in the U.S. which has
acknowledged the significance of ADR for the legal system: all lawyers in Georgia are
required to get continuing legal education in ADR.^'^ According to Georgia's Code of
Professional Responsibility the lawyers in Georgia have the legal duty to advise
potential clients about Alternative Dispute Resolution.^'^
•^ '^ Melissa Lee Himes, Georgia Court - Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution Act: Create and Fund
Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs in Each County in Georgia^ 10 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 93 (1993).
315 Peter S. Chantilis, Mediation U.S.A., 26 U. Mem. L. Rev., 1031, 1048 (1996).
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Judy C. Cohn, Custody Disputes: The Case for Independent Lawyer - Mediators, 10 Ga.St.U. L.
Rev. 487, 492-93(1994).
318 Peter S. Chantilis, Mediation U.S.A., 26 U. Mem. L. Rev., 1031, 1048 (1996).
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CHAPTER V
CONFIDENTIALITYINMEDIA TION
A) Confidentiality in Mediation
Confidentiality in mediation is essential for its success. In divorce cases where
parties often prefer to mediate the issues rather than litigate them in court, the
importance of non-disclosure of confidential information is higher than in other cases of
protection of secret information. The question of confidentiality becomes relevant if one
party tries to use information which was disclosed during a mediation session in a later
court litigation against the other spouse if mediation could not lead to a satisfactory
outcome.320 j^e issue of confidentiality can also come up if one spouse tries to
subpoena the mediator or the information the mediator got in joint or private session
with the parties, either to sue the mediator for malpractice or to support her point of
view in a subsequent litigation against the other spouse. Even after the parties have
reached an agreement in mediation, one spouse might be interested in using secret
information, gathered during the mediation process in a subsequent court - litigation to
enforce this agreement or when spouses later disagree about what the outcome of the
mediation process was.^^l Especially in these situations the party who relied on the
confidentiality of the information disclosed during mediation needs protection fi"om
unwanted disclosure.
320 John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward F. Sherman, Processes OfDispute Resolution, 379 (1996).
321 /d
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1) Effective mediation requires confidentiality^^^
Mediators in divorce cases have to help the couple to identify issues and the
underlying reasons for their conflicts, in order to promote a long-lasting post-marital
agreement. Therefore they help to promote a discussion about possible alternative
solutions to problems which arise after divorce. They have to bring the divorcing
spouses together, help them to reach an agreement on post - divorce issues and ensure
that this final settlement will be carried out. Because parties necessarily have to disclose
their deeper interests, as well as their goals during mediation, the perspective that these
secrets can be disclosed in a subsequent court litigation can tempt parties to be dishonest
and mislead their spouse during mediation.^^S Compromises in negotiations often
require the disclosure of facts that are unfavorable and therefore would not be disclosed
in an adversarial litigation process.^^4
2) Fairness in mediation requires confidentiality
In the traditional litigation process, rules of evidence and procedure, as well as
the legal advice by attorneys, protect parties and limit disclosure.325 Parties in
mediation rely on the confidentiality of the information given and often don't consider
that these communications might be disclosed later. Because the weaker and less
sophisticated spouse can easily be taken advantage of, a disclosure of secret information
by the other spouse would be seriously unfair to her.326 a clever and sophisticated
spouse could easily use this situation for the purpose of discovery of secret information
that he can use against the intellectually weaker spouse in court.^^?
^^^ Id. at 380; Jay Folberg, Confidentiality and Privilege in Divorce Mediation, in divorce mediation,
edited by Jay Folberg &. Ann Milne, 320 (1988).
323 John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward F. Sherman, Processes OfDispute Resolution. 380 (1996).
324 /J.
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3) Confidentiality and mediator's neutrality
The danger that the mediator, who should be neutral and unbiased, could
become an adversary in a subsequent litigation process would prevent most parties from
openly discussing interests and problems during the mediation process. ^^8 j\^q party
who might be disfavored by the mediator's testimony in court could feel taken
advantage of by a biased and partial mediator.329 y^js fg^r alone, that the mediator
could be biased and favor one party by disclosing confidential information of the other
party during a potential subsequent litigation, could fi^om the very beginning destroy the
confidence between the mediator and his clients and would make the mediation process
inefficient.33^
4) Confidentiality as a major reason to favor mediation to litigation
Many divorcing spouses decide to mediate their disputes rather than litigate
them because they do not want to "air the dirty laundry"^^ ' in the public and prefer to
settle a dispute without paying the price of damaging one's reputation. Therefore, if
confidential information can be disclosed, the mediation process looses this major
advantage to the traditional court - litigated divorce.
5) Mediators need confidentiality
Lack of confidentiality in mediation is not only risky for divorcing spouses but
frequent subpoenas to testify about the outcomes of mediation can also frustrate
enthusiastic mediators and prevent them from volunteer work in this field.332 j^
addition, many mediators who are imcertain about having to testify in court and about
328 m
329/^.
330/^.
3^1 Id; Jay Folberg, Confidentiality and Privilege in Divorce Mediation, in divorce mediation, edited by
Jay Folberg & Ann Milne, at 326 (1988).
332 John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward F. Sherman, Processes OfDispute Resolution. 380 (1996).
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the confidentiality of their records, might destroy these documents to protect
confidentiality.3^3
B) Restrictions to confidentiality
The critics of a broad assumption of confidentiality in mediation claim that the
right to "'every man's evidence"^^^ as a basic procedural rule can only be limited in a
certain number of cases.^^^An attempt to reconcile these two extreme positions of
complete disclosure and full confidentiality of the information is to categorize the issues
which have to remain confidential. One solution could be to keep confidential the facts,
whether a settlement was reached, its conditions, the documents parties have disclosed
during mediation, the impressions and opinions of the mediator and his suggestions to
the parties,^36 Another category of confidential information protects the persons who
should be able to enforce confidentiality, such as the main participants in the mediation
process and courts, as well as witnesses.^^^ The persons who could be obliged to keep
information confidential are the parties, the mediator and private or public third
parties.338
To sum up, confidentiality should be granted when a party in mediation in her
own interests tries to subpoena statements, documents or opinions of the mediator or the
other party in a subsequent litigation process over the same legal matter and against the
same person as in mediation; however, interests of third parties or the public should not
be involved.339
333/^. at 381.
334m
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336 Eric D. Green, A Heretical View ofa Mediation Privilege^ 2 Ohio St. J. Dispute Res. 1, 32 (1986).
337 John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward F. Sherman, Processes OfDispute Resolution. 380 (1996).
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C) Judicial or Statutory Protection of Confidentiality
Some jurisdictions recognize a mediation privilege, imposed either by court or
by statute.^'*^ However, to provide full evidence in court the number of privileges
established by common law has gradually been reduced.^'*'
1) Judicially created privilege
Some courts have accepted certain conditions as the presuppositions of any
privilege in court. The parties must have confidence that the information given during
the mediation process will not be disclosed.3'^2 j^is confidence must be essential for the
maintaining of a good relationship between the parties; furthermore, this relationship
must be one of high value and therefore has to be protected in the interest of the
community.343 Finally, comparing the benefits of disclosure and the benefits to it to the
injury it might cause, the benefit must be greater than the injury of disclosing
confidential information.344
However, whether the relationship between divorcing parties and mediators
always fulfills these criteria is questionable.345
The first criteria of parties' confidence in the mediator not to disclose secret
information is normally fulfilled. However, according to the Federal Rules of Evidence
a privilege can only be granted if it is meets "the principles of the common law in the
light of reason and experience."346 Jq meet this criteria of a "reasonable" confidence
the details of every confidentiality agreement between the parties and the mediator can
340/^ at 393.
341/^.
342 jd at 394.
343 m
344m
345 M at 396.
346 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 401.
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become important.^'^^ In most cases courts are willing to protect parties only if an
agreement in written form exists.
The second presupposition of a mediation privilege, that confidentiality is of
vital importance for the relationship between the parties and their mediator, is often
more difficult to fulfill. ^"^^ Some commentators argue against a mediation privilege by
pointing out that many states have successful mediation without a privilege and even if
a mediation privilege should be essential for the quality of this relationship, they
assume, that a "limited rather than absolute privilege, is sufficient."349
Other commentators question whether non - privilege in mediation would really
harm the profession of mediators. They assume that even if doctors, lawyers or
mediators have to disclose confidential information, they would not be out of work,
because their service would still be needed.^^^ Even though the mediator - client
relationship is based on confidence, the parties in this process will normally not
terminate their relationship just because of the danger of unpleasant disclosure.^^^
However, commentators in favor of a mediation privilege emphasize that confidentiality
is a precondition to parties to open up and discuss freely without fear, that secrets will
become public352 and accessible to friends, family members, and employers.
Finally, the mediation privilege could further frustrate the purpose of potential
litigants who decide to mediate before litigation, and to subpoena the mediator and his
^^' John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward F. Sherman, Processes of Dispute Resolution, The Role of
the Lawyers, 394(1996).
348 /J.
349 Eric D. Green, A Heretical View ofthe Mediation Privilege, 2 Ohio St. J. on Dispute Resolution 1, 32
(1986).
350 John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward F. Sherman, Processes ofDispute Resolution. The Role of
the Lawyers, 394(1996).
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documents into a subsequent litigation process. ^53 Consequently, parties will consider
seriously the pros and cons of a pre - litigation mediation session, and whether they
should spend time in mediation, which in their case could be too time - consuming and
therefore less effective. 354
Another critic of the mediation privilege emphasizes that because of this
privilege parties can hide the truth in court.355 However, even the testimony of a
mediator is not a guarantee for the truth:^^^ The mediator can lie in court and the
prospect that the parties can subpoena him, and force him to testify about details of the
mediation process, as well as some statements made by the divorcing couple, might
tempt one or both spouses to lie during mediation.357 xhe mediator consequently, in
good faith or otherwise, would expose these lies in court.358
Another argument against a mediator's testimony in court is the different
conception of dispute resolution in mediation and litigation. A court litigation is
necessarily adversarial and the mediator, who is used to approach a conflict in a
cooperative, problem - solving way, might not be a good witness in a competitive and
adversarial litigation process.359
It is debated among mediators and in courts whether the last two presuppositions
for the recognition of a mediation privilege are fulfilled - whether the community is
interested in maintaining the relationship between the mediator and his clients, and
whether the benefits of disclosing confidential information outweigh the disadvantages.
353 Mat 395.
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It is doubtful whether judges who have to decide on a mediation privilege in court will
make a positive decision and uphold confidentiality of information which was disclosed
during the mediation sessions.^^^
2) Statutory regulation of confidentiality
Mediation legislation in the last few years has dealt widely with confidentiality
issues.3^'
Meanwhile, a number of jurisdictions permits several exceptions to
confidentiality requirements.
a) Contractual Agreement to Disclose Information
An important statutory exception from confidentiality, recognized by a number
of states,362 is based on the contractual agreement between the parties and mediator that
information disclosed during the mediation process can be disclosed in a subsequent
litigation process.^^^
^"^ Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 Ohio St. J. on Dispute Res. 1, 34
(1986).
3ol Carol Izumi, Symposium on Standards of Professional Conduct in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
1995 J. ofDispute Resolution 95.
362 Izumi, id. referring to e.g., Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. Section 12 - 2238 (b)(l)(1993); Ark.Code Ann.
Section 2-7-202(b) (Michie 1993); Cal.Evid.Code Section 1152.5(a)(4) (West 1994); Colo.Rev.Stat.
Section 13-22-307 (2)(a) (1993); Fla.Stat.Ann. Section 44.102 (3) (West 1994); Ind.Code Ann. Section
4-6-9-4(b)(2) (West 1994); Mich.Comp.Laws Section 691.- 1557(l)(a) (1993); Miss.Code Ann. Section
69-2-47 (1993); Mo.Rev.Stat. Section 17.06 (a) (1991); Mont.Code Ann. Section 26-1-811 (1993);
Neb.Rev.Stat. Section 25-2914 (1994); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. Section 328:C (9) (1993); N.D.Cent.Code
Section 31-04-11 (1993); Or.Rev.Stat. Section 36.205 (1991); Tenn.Code Ann. Section 36-4-130 (b)
(1993); Tex.Code Ann. Section 154.073 (b) (West 1994); Utah Code Ann. Section 78-3 lb-7(l)( 1993);
Va.Code Ann. Section 8.01-581.22 (Michie 1993); Wash.Rev.Code Section 5.60.070 (l)(a)(1994);
Wis.Stat.Ann. Section 904.085(4)(b) (West 1994); Wyo.Stat. Section 1.43-103 (1993).
363 Izumi, id
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b) Disciplinary actions against the mediator
The second exception from confidentiahty, accepted in several states, arises in
disciplinary actions against the mediator364 j^ order to prove a breach of his duties,365
or when parties seek damages in a subsequent action against the mediator.366
c) Integrity of the mediation process
Some states allow the disclosure of confidential information to preserve the
integrity of the mediation process itself.^^^ The purpose might be to enforce the actual
agreement to mediate^^S or to enforce the mediated agreement itself^^^ or to prove the
validity of the mediated agreement.370 An agreement might be invalid due to fraud,
duress or misrepresentation.^^^
d) Administration of Justice
Besides other exceptions that are of minor importance in divorce cases, some
states have established the right to disclose information in order to maintain the
"administration ofjustice",372for example, to prove the prejudice of a witness. ^ 73
^^^ Izumi, id. referring to Fla.Stat.Ann. Section 44.102 (4) (West 1994).
365 Izumi, id referring to Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. Section 12-2238 (b)(2) (1993); Colo.Rev.Stat. Section 13-
22-307 (2)(d) (1993); N.D.Cent.Code Section 31-04-1 1 (1993).
366 Izumi, id. referring to, e.g., Mich.Comp.Laws Section 691.-1557(l)(b) (1993); Neb.Rev.Stat.
Section 25-2914 (1994); Okla. Stat.Ann. tit. 12, Section 1805 (f) (West 1994); Or.Rev.Stat. Section
36.205(2)(b) (1991); Tenn.Code Ann. Section 36-4-130 (b) (2) (1993); Va.Code Ann. Section 8.01-
581.22 (Michie 1993); Wash.Rev.Code Section 5.60.070(g) (1994).
367 Izumi, id
368 Izumi, id. referring to Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. Section 12-2238 (b)(4)(1993).
369 Izumi, id. referring to Wyo.Stat. Section 1.43-103 © (v)(1993).
370 Izumi, id. referring to N.D.Cent.Code Section 31-04-1 1 (1993).
371 Carol Izumi, id.
^'^^Id
373 Izumi, id. referring to, e.g., Haw.Rev.Stat. Section 408 (1993); N.C.Gen.Stat. Section 7a-38(8)©
(1993); Wis.Stat.Ann. Section 904.085 (4)(e)(1994).
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3) Contractual Agreements to protect ConfidentialiW
Prior to mediation parties and the mediator can agree that all information
disclosed in joint or in separate mediation sessions will remain confidential and that the
parties will not subpoena the mediator or his notes of the mediation process in a
possible subsequent litigation.374 Many mediation programs, such as the ABA
Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes, frequently ask parties
and mediators to sign an agreement of confidentiality. ^^^ To be valid, this agreement
must be in written form, clear and specific enough to show mutual consent.^^^However,
an agreement between the mediator and the parties not to disclose information unless all
participants in the mediation process agree to it, can conflict with public policy not to
suppress evidence in litigation.^^^ In Simrin v. Simrin the California Court of Appeals
upheld the confidentiality agreement between two spouses and a marriage counselor,
even though it conflicted with public policy, because this counseling was aimed at
preserving the marriage, and therefore an open and fearless discussion about private
problems was of vital importance.^^^ When husband and wife are attending a marriage
counseling session they want to express their inner feelings and concerns, as well as
their interest in preserving the marital bond; otherwise "the purpose of counseling is
frustrated."379
However, there is a significant difference between cases of marriage counseling
and confidentiality issues on the one hand and divorce mediation on the other hand. The
^"^^ Kent L. Brown, Confidentiality In Mediation: Status And Implications, 1991 J. Disp. Resol. 307, 318
(1991); John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward F. Sherman, Processes Of Dispute Resolution, 415
(1996).
^'^ ABA Standards ofPracticefor LoMyer Mediators in Family Disputes, sec. 11. A.
^^" John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward F. Sherman, Processes OfDispute Resolution, 416 (1996).
3'7'7 Simrin v. Simrin . 233 Cal. App. 2d 90, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1964).
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agreement of confidentiality in Simrin v. Simrin concerned a situation in which both
partners tried to preserve their marriage, whereas in divorce mediation parties have
already decided to get divorced and only try to reconcile differences as to the post -
marital financial, custodial and property issues.
It is therefore doubtful whether a court would generally uphold an agreement
between the parties and the mediator that is contrary to public policy.^^^
^°^ John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward F. Sherman, Processes OfDispute Resolution, 419 (1996).
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The divorce process is highly emotional and complex; the "rigidity" of the court
system^^l jg ^ot appropriate to meet the "emotional dynamics"^^^ of every divorce
process. The adversary, highly formal and strict procedural approach to a complex and
multi - centered issue can even enlarge the gap and polarize the positions between the
divorcing spouses.^83 Jhe issues parties are facing after they decide to dissolve their
marital bond are diverse; and so are the emotional challenges.
Mediators can have educational backgrounds other than law, e.g., social and
behavioral sciences, psychology and therapy,^^'^ and therefore are often better prepared
to deal with the complex emotional issues in divorce cases. Lawyer - mediators,
however, can have the advantage of knowing the probable outcome in a court - litigated
divorce process and they can provide the parties with a comparison of a mediated and
litigated process. However, lawyer - mediators rarely have additional degrees in social
and behavioral sciences. ^85 Nevertheless, according to scientific research, the most
important qualities a mediator should have are "personality traits", ^^^ enhanced by the
38
1 Terenia Urban Guill, A Framework For Understanding And Using ADR, 71 Tul. L. Rev. 1323
(1997).
382 /(/at 1323 -1327.
383/^.
384 Scott Hughes, Elizabeth 's Story: Exploring Power Imbalances In Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 553, 571 (1995).
385/^.
386 Jessica Pearson et al., A Portrait ofDivorce Mediation Services in the Public and Private Sector, 21
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 1, 22 (1983).
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ability to be objective and credible; knowledge as well as experience are of less
importance.
Books and articles on mediation, as well as other ADR methods, will continue to
flood law libraries. Alternative processes of dispute resolution are now part of optional
training in law schools. However, even if mediation is by its nature £in alternative to the
adversarial court - litigated process, legal rules and principles will play a larger role in
future. A process which does not provide a security net for the severely weaker party
with significantly less bargaining power will otherwise support "the survival of the
fittest". Even though the mediation process is a form of "private ordering"387^ which by
its nature provides the possibility of tailoring an agreement adapted to the parties'
individual perception of justice, the mediation process in general takes place "in the
shadow of the law"^^^. Even though the many divorce cases can successfully and time-
efficiently be settled in mediation, cases of abuse and severe power imbalance have to
be excluded from mediation and settled in court, where rules of civil procedure and a
powerful judge can secure equal rights to share the marital pie after divorce.
In summary, mediation in divorce cases has been highly successftil and enabled
divorcing couples to resolve their disputes in a fair, time- and cost-effective way.
Legislature and courts are working on the improvement of the mediation programs and
will ftirther legitimize this technique in family disputes, especially in divorce cases.
•^^^ John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward F. Sherman, Processes of Dispute Resolution, 310 (1996).
^°° Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case for
Divorce, 88 Yale L. J. 950, 968 (1979).
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